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Vulnerabilities and Safe~uards in Networks with QoS support
Sonia Fahrny, Srinivas R. Avasarala, Venkatesh Prabhakar
Abstract
'We identify the seCl1rity risks involved in quality of service (QoS) enabled networks. Simulation
and experimental studie.'> are used to quantify the performance degradation experienced by flows due
to security breaches. We propose network monitoring tools, intrusion detection systems and security
protocols to safeguard against the security threat::; in an adaptive manner.
1 Introduction
The proliferation of high speed networks and multimedia applications is increasing the demand for high
Quality of Service (QoS) in the Internet. Applications such as e-commercc, audio and video conferencing,
distance learning have become increasingly popular over the last few years. The best effort network protocols
currently deployed are inadequate to handle the service requirements of these applications. Networks with
QoS support address these requirements of high bandwidth and low delay. Several components are required to
build a QoS framework. Connection admission control, policy control, QoS routing and resource reservations
arc requircd to cnsure that sufficient resources exist for QoS guarantees to be meL Traffic shaping and
policing, scheduling and buffer management are required to control resource usage. Finally, traffic monitoring
and feedback control are important to avoid congestion collapse in computer networks. These components
fOrm the building blocks of a framework for supporting QoS based applications. These building blocks are
used in the Integrated Services and Differentiated Services architectures and with traffi(: engineering for label
switched paths.
The Integrated Services (IS) [13] framework requires resources to be reserved <1 priori for a given traffic
flow (also called micro-How). The Resource ReserVation Protocol (RSVP) [14]establishes distributed state
in routers and hosts related to resource reservation if the reservation request is accepted. A packet classifier
is used to identify Hows that are to receive 11 certain level of service and a packet scheduler handles the
service of different packet flows to ensure that QoS commitments are meL The main problem with the
integrated services model has been scalability, especially in large public IP networks which may potentially
have millions of concurrent micro-flows.
The Differentiated Services (DS) framework [3] is more scalable for service differentiation in the InterneL
The current Internet can be DS enabled without major overhauling. Packets are classified and the DS field
in the IP header [2] is marked to receive a purticular per-hop forwarding behavior on nodes along their path.
Emphasis is placed on shifting the complexity to the edges where ingress and egress router performing traffic
metering, policing and shaping. The internal nodes merely Corward the packets. Though QoS frameworks like
Integrated Services and Differentiated Services have evolved, security threats and vulnerabilities introduced
have not been extensively studied.
With the introduction of more points of control that are required to provide QoS, the security threats
increase. The potential points of attack increase as additional entities are used to provide service differ-
entiation. Also there is more incentive Cor a malicious user in terms of the much higher service gained by
exploiting these vulnerabilities. In this work, we study such vulnerabilities and classify the risks involved in
the terms of potential damage caused. We also provide recommendations and adaptive solutions that use a
combination of network monitoring tools, intrusion detection systems and inherently secure protocols.
2 Background
In this section we review the background work on Quality of Service with special emphasis on Differentiated
Services, and Network Security.
2.1 Quality of Service Architectures
The Differentiated Services architecture [1] shifts control functions to the edge of a domain, making the core
only responsible for forwarding based on a classification done at the edge. The DS field in the IP packet
header is used to indicate the forwarding treatment a packet should receive. While DS standardizes a number
of Per-Hop Behavior (PHB) groups, some others have local significance only. A PHB, expedited forwarding
(EF) [6] and a PHD group, assured forwarding (AF) [5], have been standardized. Several classes of services
are defined using different classification, policing, shaping and scheduling rules.
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Typically, a customer agrees upon a Service Level Specification (SLS) with an Internet Service Provider
(ISP) in order to obtain Differentiated Services from it. An SLS may implicitly or explicitly specify a
Traffic Conditioning Specification (TCS) which defines cla:;sification, metering, marking, discarding and
shaping rules. Traffic is conditioned at the ingress touter of a DS domain by classification (marking of DS
field), shaping (delaying) Or policing (dropping). When a packet traverses the boundary between different
DS domains, the DS field of a packet may be re-marked according to the existing agreement between the
domains.
As Differentiated Services become more widely deployed, interoperability with other technologies becomes
important. Typically, edge networks are RSVP enabled and the core transit network is DS enabled. In this
scenario, the RSVP networks (on the edges) may be considered as customers of the transit DS network. The
edge routers (at the edge of the RSVP and DS networks) are both RSVP and DS capable. RSVP signaling
is carried out transparently through the DS network. The DSCP marking can either be done at the host
itself or at an intermediate router. RSVP reservations have to be converted into appropriate DS PHBs for
achieving end-to-end QoS.
2.1.1 Policy Control
A general policy framework identifies the functional elements and protocols required to support QoS policy
in the network. Policies for fair access to resources must be stored, accessed, updated and monitored. The
COPS protocol [9] provides a client/server model for distributed policy management in a network. COPS
can be used within a domain for router policy enforcement points (PEPs) to retrieve policy from policy
distribution points. TCP is used as the transport protocol for reliable exchange of messages between policy
clients and a server. State management is a large component of COPS. Policy distribution points (PDPs)
maintain state for all PEP requests until informed to delete that state. PEPs periodically report status
information to the PDP related to accounting and monitoring of requests. The COPS protocol is also being
extended for policy provisioning.
2.2 Network Security Threats
Well known attacks like IF spoofing, SYN flooding and sequence number guessing have been studied from the
perspective of the existing best effort networks. These attacks could have higher motive and wider dimension
is a QoS enabled network. Most of the attacks could be classified under the following categories
• Network Denial of Service - An attack in which legitimate users arc prevented from using their share
of the network or network resources by some malicious users. Service overloading, message flooding
and clogging the network are some of the commonly used teclmiques for performing denial of service.
• Session Hijacking - This involves sei7.ing control of the network connection of a legitimate user. Once
an attacker has successfully hijacked the connection, he is able to supply commands on behalf of the
user.
• Masquerading - This involves identity theft which is the misuse of another user's identity with the
objective of taking actions permitted to the owner of the identity. A common form of this attack
occurs when a user executes a protocol with an entity that pretends to be the user with another entity
using the same protocol and information passed to itself by the user in the protocol.
• Information Leakage - Failures in the protocol or implementation may lead to an attacker gathering
information about a session that he otherwise would not have been able to deduce.
• Unauthorized Resource Use - Compromise of any device on a network constitutes uIluuthori7.ed resource
use.
3 Related Work
In this section we discuss related work on network security tools and recent efforts to secure QoS.
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3.1 Network Security Tools
Several solutions for preventing and recovering from the above attacks exist. Network based tools operate at
the network level and typically detect the origin of attack. They are also used to safeguard against attacks
by rejecting unauthenticated packets. Host based tools monitor for attacks on the local host. They can aJso
be used to detect if the host is used as the origin of any attack. Some important tools are discussed below.
Firewall Tools These are used to safeguard against unwanted intrusion (especially IP address spoofing).
These are basically packet filters that are augmented with a lot ohules to accept or reject packets. FircwaJls
are typically placed at the border of a network, between an organization and the rest of the Internet. They
can also be used as an access control measure to prevent misuse of the Internet by the internal network.
Drawbridge, SOCKS, Firewall Configuration Tool (FCT) are some of firewall tools developed. Incorporating
efficient encryption schemes and lookup algorithms are currently being researched.
Traceback Tools Traceback tools are used to trace attacks, especially Denial of Service, to the origin
of the attack. Earlier mechanisms used ingress filtering, link testing (by input debugging or controlled
flooding) and logging to counter such threats. Recent IP traceback mechanisms include support in the
routers to probabilistically mark packets with partial path information[12]. Thus there is a high probability
that when an attack occurs at a particular site, a collection of such packets that constitute the attack would
yield information about the path and hence the origin of the attack. Another form of traceback, the ICMP
traceback [11] emits a traceback packet (a new ICMP message type) to the destination of the traced packet
,vith a probability of about 20~QD. Information about the previous hop, next hop, time-stamp and the traced
packet form a part of the traceback message. This helps in detecting the path in event of a denial of service
attack.
Intrusion Detection Tools Intrusion detection tools are used to detect attacks by monitoring system
resources. They are both host based and network based. A variety of mechanisms and architectures have
been proposed for intrusion detection including using autonomous agents, adaptive and automated methods.
SWATCH is a log scanner that monitors messages written to a log file. Trip-wire is a file and directory
integrity checker. Internet Security Scanner is a network based intrusion detection tool that is used to detect
wrong configuration in networks.
3.2 Recent Efforts to Secure QoS
Network administrators are expected to protect network resources by cOltfiguring secure policers at interfaces
with untrusted customers. Some of the recently developed protocols arc briefly examined here.
• Securing Policy Exchange - Security considerations are vital to the COPS protocol. The COPS spec-
ification discusses an integrity object that must be supported by all COPS implementations. The
specification also highlights the use of IPSec to secure the communication between the PDPs and
PEPs.
• Use of IPSec with RSVP - RSVP was extended to use the Security Parameter Index (SPI) in IPSec to
provide similar functionality as the TCPjUDP like ports. RSVP message processing is also modified
to handle this case.
• IPSec with Differentiated Services - IPSec does not provide any defense against an adversary's modifi-
cation of the DS field. Only IPSec tunneling capabilities can encapsulate a DS packet so that the DS
code-point is protected by the encapsulation.
• RSVP Integrity Object - To ensure the integrity of the admission control meclianism, RSVP requires the
ability to protect its messages against corruption and spoofing. The RSVP Integrity Object contains
a message digest (HMAC-MD5 is recommended but not required) along with a sequence number.
These two clements protect against forgery and replay attacks. Confidentiality is not offered by this
mechanism. Key management for the Integrity Object mechanism requires further investigation. The
requirements for a key management system are presented in the specification along with ideas of
possible integration with Kerberos.
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4 Results
4.1 Identification of Top Security Risks in QoS Networks
In this section we present the top security risks in QoS networks. The two most important points of
attack are the configuration process and the data forwarding process [4]. Attack operations include injecting
malicious packets, modifying information in the packets, delaying and dropping packets, and to a lesser extent
eavesdropping. All attack operations aim at either theft of resources or denial of fair share of resources to
the legitimate user. Since QoS networks provision resources based on service differentiation, this would lead
to a violation of agreed upon policies.
Attacking the QoS configuration
• Modifying configuration information in routers - The configuration information stored in the edge
routers determines how the traffic is shaped, while that at the core routers determines how a packet
is forwarded. By altering the information at edge routers, an attacker can cause a change in the
implementation of agreed upon TCS, thereby exploiting the change made. By modifying the PHB
specifications stored in the tore routers the attacker can not only gain better service, but also degrade
the service offered to other legitimate users.
• Altering dissemination of configuration information - Service Level Agreements (SLAs) arc llsually
decided by exchanging negotiation messages between trusted Bandwidth Brokers (BBs) und the edge
routers at DS domains. These negotiations are also done between edge routers of peer DS domains.
Additionally PHB specifications are propagated to core routers. These messages form vital points of
attack because modifying the negotiation messages alters the configuration information directly which
the attacker (:an later exploit.
• Compromising Bandwidth Brokers - Bandwidth brokers maintain the local policy and are responsible
for resource allocation in a DS domain. Compromising these would yield the attacker complete control
over a DS domain.
• Configuration information leakage - A passive attacker can eavesdrop and learn the configuration
information and exploit any over-provisioned resources. This could go undetected if proper monitoring
tools are not in place.
Attacking the packet delivery
• Theft of service by IF address spoofing - This attack is possible because of the well known problem
of IP spoofing. An attacker can spoof the IF source address and pretend to be a source which gets
a better service with a particular Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP). Thus the attacker gets
better service than he should normally get. Also the attacker manages to deny the legitimate user the
quality of service that he should get.
• Modifying header information of packets - AF service and EF service, the two most widely implemented
service differentiation schemes rely on the ingress router performing traffic conditioning by looking at
fields in the header. Thus the information in the header is a vital point of attack. If an attacker
successfully changes the DSCP field in the header of a packet, he can effectively perform denial or
degradation of service to the legitimate user. Since the header fields are currently not protected
against modifications, this attack is not very difficult.
• Maliciously delaying and dropping packets - This kind of attack occurs on the path between the user
and the DS domain. Compromised routers can be used to deliberately delay and drop packets from a
legitimate user, while the attacker can make use of the services offered by the DS domain for that user.
Simulation results for attacks on differentiated service networks Simulation experiments were
carried out to determine the effect of DSCP changes of unauthorized traffic flows on the throughput of
authorized flows. These were carried out on the Network Simulator-2(ns). The Diffserv implementation
for ns [7] was used to augment it to provide service differentiation capabilities like AF and EF PHBs. We
implemented functions to update the DSCP and to perform dropping of EF packets when the traffic was
above the committed rate irrespective of the queuing function used. The setup consisted of two traffic sources
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Figure 1: Simulation Experiment Setup
A Time Sliding Window (TSW) tagger was used to meter the packets. Policing was dOHl:! by a Time
Sliced Window Three Color Marker (TSW3CrvI) policer. The scheduler used was a Weighted Round Robin
(\VRR) scheduler with two RED queues(70%, 30% weights) and three drop precedences within each queue.
Experiments were carried out for both AF and EF PHBs with CBR, FTP a.nd Telnet traffic.
For both sources 51 and 52, we used a committed rate of 10 Mb/s, a peak rate of 50 Mb/s and an actual
data rate of 7 Mb/s. The experiments were carried out for 150 seconds. For the initial 50 seconds of the
simulation, source S2 uses a lower PHB than the one used by source 51. During the next 100 seconds of
the simulation the D5CP used by source 52 was changed to that of source 51 to study the effect bandwidth
stealing on authorized users like source 51. The summary of results is shown in the table below.
Source 81 Source S2 Normal Throughput Changed Throughput
PHB/Agent PHB/Agent (SI/S2) (kb;,) (SI/S2) (kb;,)
EF/CBR BE/CBR 3519.04/1483.63 2862.56/2140.69
EF/CBR AFll/CBR 3502.13/1502.61 2854.66/2148.48
EF/CBR AFI2/CBR 3502.72/1500.91 2849.60/2153.71
EF/CBR AFI3/CBR 3517.17/1486.03 2854.77/2148.53
EF/CBR AF21/CBR 3527.68/1474.83 2863.36/2139.89
AFll/CBR BE/CBR 4998.35/4.0 2665.01/2339.68
AFI2/CBR BE/CBR 4996.59/4.0 2663.52/2339.63
AFI3/CBR BE/CBR 4991.31/4.0 2661.92/2340.0
AF21/CBR BE/CBR 4979.19/4.0 2657.81/2341.01
AFll/CBR AFI2/CBR 4996.64/6.13 2662.88/2341.54
AFll/CBR AFI3/CBR 4998.07/4.21 2664.75/2340.16
AFll/CBR AF21/CBR 4997.97/4.16 2664.90/2339.73
EF/FTP AFll/CBR 2725.49/2276.85 918.29/4083.41
EF/Telnet AFll/CBR 8.10/4993.97 6.40/4995.84
It is observed in all the cases that there is a marked difference in the throughput achieved by the source
1 between the normal run and the run when source 2 steals bandwidth from it.
Another interesting scenario is the division of excess bandwidth between various flows at the routers
when the D5 domains are over provisioned. We used a topology similar to the one in figure 1, but with
all the links between edge, core and destinations as 12Mb/s links. The traffic policies for the Hows from
sources 51 and 52 were altered to allow a peak rate of 6Mb/s and a committed rate of 5Mb/s. The actual
sending rates of the sources was 7Mb/s. In an initial run, we let only source 51 send data. We notice that
though its sending rate is higher than its committed and peak rates, it still achieves a throughput equal to
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its sending rate due the over-provisioning in the OS domain. This is despite the downgrading of its PHB
due to overshooting the committed rate. 'We then let source S2 also send data. In this case we notice that
S2 achieves a bandwidth of 5.23 rvIb/s, using up some of the over-provisioned bandwidth in the OS domain.
Source 81 achieves a bandwidth of 6.75 Mb/s, below its sending rate of 7 Mb/s.
4.2 Proposed Solutions
Protecting flows entering a DS domain In a OS domain, the authentication of user traffic is done by
the edge routers. Edge routers are configured with the user profiles, as SLAs, and must do OSCP validation
to allow only valid user traffic flows. Since traffic flows are identified using IP source addresses, IF spoofing
is a serious security threat. Another threat to user traffic flows arc modification of packets on the way to the
edge routers. This modification will alter information in the packet used for identifying valid users. Both
the above problems can be handled by using IPSec tunnels between the host and its ingress router, i.e., an
edge router of the OS domain. Since IPSec tunneling uses the inner packet for its cryptographic calculations,
the packet fields are secure against any modifications on the way. Also, tills end-ta-end security mechanism
prevents any malicious user from taking on the identity of another user for stealing bandwidth.
Protecting BBs, Edge and Core Routers All the components of a OS domain, the BBs, the Edge
and the Core routers, contain sensitive information that can be subject to attacks. Bandwidth brokers
contain SLAs, and configuration information for edge and core routers. The Edge routers contain user traffic
profiles along with traffic conditioning parameters like token bucket rates, committed rates and peak rates.
The Core routers contain PHB setup information and buffer management parameters for schemes like RED,
RIO. Attacks on this information can be detected using intrusion detection tools. Intrusion detection has
two major areas of research, anomaly detection and pattern recognition. Anomaly detection is based on
determining patterns of normal behavior for networks, hosts and users and then detecting behavior that is
significantly different. Pattern recognition aims to detect patterns of activity that match known intruder
attack scenarios.
Protecting Configuration Messages Bandwidth Brokers disseminate configuration information to edge
and core routers using protocols like RSVP, SNMP, COPS or other similar signaling mechanisms. Recent
research suggests using IPSec along with COPS or RSVP to secure communication between the POPs (like
BBs) and PEPs (like edge/core routers). The RSVP integrity object can also be used to ensure integrity
of signaling messages. Hop integrity in networks is another interesting approach to this problem [10]. The
authors suggest addition of a secret exchange layer and an integrity check layer above and belm" the network
layer respectively. This is aimed at detecting message modification and message replay between any two
communicating devices.
QoS Monitoring Tools Continuous monitoring of network activity is required to maintain confidence
in the security of the network. Network monitors can be installed at strategic locations in a OS domain
to coiled information from all the OS components and examine the information continuollsly to identify
suspicious activity. Collected information can include among other things, the configuration data of each
router, the current bandwidth usage of each router etc. At regular intervals, the configuration data at a
router can be verified to be the same as the one computed at a POP (a BB). Also one can monitor the
bandwidth usage of a router and compare it with the sum of traffic profiles configured at that router to
indicate any theft.
Traceback MechanisIlls In addition to measures for preventing attacks, we also need mechanisms in place
to trace attacks back to their source. As explained in an earlier section there are two interesting schemes
proposed in this area. One of them uses special ICMP messages [11] to probabilistically send information
about a traced packet traversing through the router. The information contains, among other things, the
back link and the front link used by the packet, a time-stamp and the traced packet. A second scheme relies
on encoding the path in the IP header's ill field [12]. This scheme has an advantage that no extra traffic is
generated. Another advantage is that the trace information is bound to the packet itself and hence will not
follow a different path and will not be differentially blocked by firewalls.
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5 Future Work
In this section we describe additional simulation experiments, testbed setup, and tools that we propose to
implement. \Ve will be focusing mainly on the monitoring tools, but will also complete the simulation and
testbed setup, and investigate other tools if time allows.
5.1 Simulation Experiments
'Ve have shown the effect of performance degradation that occurs because of DSCP modification attacks in
QoS networks. We plan to simulate further attack scenarios using the following topologies.
• A network of clients, a DS domain as the transit network and a network of servers. This would be
useful in studying attacks outside the DS domain.
• Using several DS domains in the transit network. This would help in studying 8aw~ in negotiations
bet\",een DS domains like the effects of code point re-marking.
• Non DS enabled nodes in DS domains. This would help in studying both the dissemination of config-
uration information within the DS domain and also routing the packets within the domain as per the
specified PHBs.
We further plan to study the effects of altering the configuration process by simulating a bandwidth broker.
5.2 Linux Testbed Setup
We will implement some of the attacks on a Linux testbed to study the performance degradation and
Wlcover possible security holes and bugs in the implementations. We plan to use PCs running Linux as
nodes in the network. We shall be using the Differentiated Services support for the Linux implementation
[8J. This implementation uses additional fields in packet headers for classifying them. A queuing discipline
to support multiple drop priorities is used for supporting AF PHB. EF PHB is built using the Class Based
Queuing (CBQ). The authors have designed GRED, a generalized RED mechanism for buffer management
in the queues. A Token Bucket Filter is used to shape the traffic. The implementation allows a node to be
configured as an Edge router or as a Core router.
5.3 Monitoring Tool Implementation
"\Ve plan to implement a monitoring tool that would reside at the edge routers and constantly monitor
bandwidth and other system resources that are specific to Diffserv. These include configuration information,
PHB specifications, current bandwidth usage and provisioned bandwidth. This would enable us to detect
any theft of over-provisioned resources. Also we could monitor the resource usage of flows periodically to
guarantee appropriate service levels are not compromised.
5.4 Traceback Tool Implementation
We plan to implement a traceback tool on the Linux testbed. We will adopt the approach of prohabilistically
encoding the path in the IP header's field (12]. We will include this functionality in the edge router as the
complexity would be at the edges and also because that would enable us to pin down the route to the DS
domains through which the packet passed.
5.5 Securing Message Exchanges
We plan to implement a way to secure the message exchanges for disseminating the configuration information
between the BBs and the edge routers and the PHB specifications between the edge and the core routers.
We plan to usc the hop integrity approach to secure the message exchanges [10]. This would entail using a
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